



**Agency Problems Concerning the Handling of Fan
Misbehaviour and its Punishment in Football**

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Agency Problems Concerning the Handling of Fan Misbehaviour and its Punishment in Football

November 9, 2021

Abstract

Purpose: On the example of professional football in Germany, this paper analyses the conflict about the punishment of fan misbehaviour within an agency-theoretical framework to cast light on the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the sentences and to show possible solutions.

Design: In a pre-study, more than 1,300 hand-collected past sentences against clubs by the German and European sports courts were analysed to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the penalties so far. Additionally, in the main study, 26 expert interviews with German representatives of the football association, courts, clubs, sponsors, police, and active fan scenes allow a deep insight into the relationships of the involved parties.

Findings: The paper suggests that the sentences do not sufficiently consider several agency problems. Due to moral hazard, they exert hardly any influence on fan behaviour and only a small one on the clubs. While the lightening of pyrotechnics is by far the most punished type of misbehaviour, most of the interviewees cite the impossibility of preventing it. Despite the sentences, some clubs make unpublic agreements with their fans about still tolerable misconduct or do not pass the penalties on to the polluters as intended by the association. The findings highlight the importance of communication for less misbehaviour.

Originality: For the first time, agency theory and the economic theory of optimal punishment are brought together with insights from interviews with the involved parties. We discover a two-stage principal-agent problem and get new insights into stakeholders' hidden motivations and attitudes. The results should encourage a debate on the current penalties and possible solutions to the recurring problem of pyrotechnics.

1 Introduction

Every season, professional football clubs in Europe pay millions of Euro in fines for their fans' misconduct. In Germany, for example, more than three million Euro were paid in the 2018/19 season. In most national leagues as well as in UEFA European cup competitions, these penalties are pronounced by the sports courts of the relevant associations as the associations oppose against any violence or discrimination in their statutes (FIFA 2019b, UEFA

2020b).

The football associations hold the clubs liable for compliance (UEFA 2020a, FIFA 2019a) and punish them for infringements by their fans. Although the goal of punishment is to prevent recurrent misconduct, punishable misbehaviour occurs again and again. As a result, one has to question the effectiveness of these penalties. Against this background, the aim of this paper is to cast light on the reasons for the ineffectiveness and to show possible solutions.

Our subjective impression that the penalties have been ineffective so far serves as a starting point of our analysis. In a quantitative pre-study, the punishments of past convictions between the seasons 2013/14 and 2019/20 in Germany, which is the country with the largest football association worldwide, are collected to analyse their development over time. Our data reveal that the number of convictions as well as the number of punished games have not been decreased over time, which supports our assumption of the penalties ineffectiveness, as they are unable to fulfil their goal.

In the main study, we are looking for the reasons for the ineffectiveness and possible solutions. Since we are the first who scientifically examine these reasons, we choose an exploratory, qualitative research design. To classify and assess the effects of penalties and the actual handling of misconduct, various interest groups and their relationships are considered in this study. The penalties are imposed by the sports courts, who are subject to the rules and regulations of the German Football Asso-

ciation (DFB) and the German Football League (DFL), respectively. Their committees in turn consist to a large extent of representatives of the clubs. In addition, although the clubs are punished, the misconduct emanates from their fans. The punishments themselves can have reputational effects for the club, which in turn can affect various stakeholders. These dependencies may result in different agency problems that are illuminated in this study. To get deeper insights, expert interviews were conducted with representatives of the sports jurisdiction, the DFB, the clubs and their main sponsors, the media, the police as well as active fan scene and ultra-groups¹.

Principal-agent relationships have already been studied in various fields of sports and football (Frick 2011, Schubert 2014) but not in context with fan misbehaviour. Research on fan behaviour is also very extensive but mostly sociologically driven (Dunning et al. 1986, Marsh 1978, Stott & Reicher 1998). So far, only very few papers have looked at the penalties for fan misbehaviour (Noli 2016, Paasonen & Aaltonen 2017, Shvets 2016) and none has explored them in an agency-theoretical framework.

The paper seeks to make the following contributions to the existing literature: First, it extends previous research as it is the first to model the punishment of fan misbehaviour as an agency problem. It places the penalties in the complex relationships of the football universe.

Second, the perspectives of all important stakeholders are taken into account and brought together for the first time on this topic. We thus got a holistic picture of fan misbehaviour and its punishment. This allows us to make internal processes visible for the first time, which previously remained hidden due to information asymmetries.

Third, we are the first to point out that the penalties cannot fully create incentive compatibility and thus do not achieve their goals. Therefore, the current penalty system seems to be more than questionable. Instead, the findings highlight the importance of communication and dialogue for less misbehaviour.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview over the relevant literature. The institutional background and the principal-agent relationships are described in Section 3. The methodology and the data are introduced in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results (**first of the quantitative pre-study, then of the qualitative main study**), which are followed by a discussion in Section 6. The paper ends with a conclusion in Section 7.

2 Literature Review

Under the assumption of rational behaviour, each individual maximises his subjective expected utility (von Neumann & Morgenstern 2007, Selten 1991). Therefore, advantages and disadvantages are weighed up when choosing the best alternative course of action. According to the economic theory of optimal punishment, individuals are the less misbehaving, the higher the expected costs of misconduct are (Becker 1968, Polinsky & Shavell 1979). Various variables influence the expected costs, e. g., the probability of conviction and the level of penalties. Grogger (1991) shows that increasing the probability of a conviction has a stronger positive influence than increasing the penalty. The expected value of illegal behaviour is determined by the ex-

pected pay out, the penalty, the probability of detection, the individual discount rate and the expected time lag between the criminal behaviour and the punishment (Becker 1968, Eide et al. 1994, Warner & Pleeter 2001). While the individual discount rate cannot be influenced externally, the football associations have the possibility to prevent misconduct by a high probability of detection, the penalty level and prompt punishment.

Since the football associations do not directly punish the misbehaving fans, but rather the clubs, different stakeholders and their relations to each other are included in our paper. While Zagnoli & Radicchi (2010) and García & Welford (2015) emphasize the importance of the fans as stakeholders, the main (so-called definitive) stakeholders of football clubs have been identified by Senaux (2008), Anagnostopoulos (2011) and Cicut et al. (2017). These are the supporters groups², the politics, the football associations, the media, and the sponsors. Following other scientific work in the field of football (Biscaia et al. 2018, García & Welford 2015, Holt 2007, Junghagen 2018, Zagnoli & Radicchi 2010), we also take them into account in our study.

The relationships between clubs and fans can be characterised as principal-agent relationships (Coleman 1994, Ross 1973). Following Schubert (2014), we use the positivist agency theory, which aims to identify, describe and explain observable problems of relationships (Eisenhardt 1989, Fama & Jensen 1983, Jensen & Meckling 1976). Apart from simple principal-agent relationships, we also look at a so-called two-stage principal-agent problem. As this kind of multiple delegation problems has already been addressed in the literature (Moe 1984, Strøm 2000), but not in the context of football, we explore a new field of application.

Principal-agent relationships in football and sports have been studied with respect to various stakeholders and a wide range of topics. This includes principal-agent relationships between clubs and sponsors regarding the arrangements of sponsorship (Farrelly & Quester 2003), connections among clubs respectively players in the context of structuring employment contracts (Frick 2011) or relationships between clubs and associations concerning UEFA financial fair play (Schubert 2014). Atkinson et al. (1988), who also looked on the relationship between clubs and associations focussing on revenue sharing, additionally describe the involvement of several agents. In our paper, different agents are considered as well, but with the focus on the punishment of fan misbehaviour.

The behaviour and misbehaviour of fans has received high scientific attention since the last century being mostly studied from a sociological point of view (Dunning et al. 1986, Marsh 1978, Stott & Reicher 1998, Taylor 1971). One main kind of misbehaviour, namely the forbidden usage of pyrotechnics, and the hardened fronts on this subject, the legal aspects and the environmental impact have led to some research in recent years (Brechtbühl et al. 2017, Choluj et al. 2020, Pirker et al. 2020). The punishment of fan misbehaviour by the sports jurisdiction, however, has not been investigated that much. Whereas Hilpert (2009), Noli (2016), Shvets (2016), Tsoukala (2013), and Vasilyev et al. (2018) analyse the legal legitimacy of the penalties, there is only little research focussing (to some extent) on their effects (Paasonen & Aaltonen 2017, Shvets 2016). So far, no one has analysed the extent to which the objectives of the penalties were achieved, as well as their ability to create incentive compatibility, and has placed the penalties in the complex

relationships of the football universe. In this paper, we will take a first step to close this research gap.

3 Principal-Agent Relationships

Principal-agent relationships are characterised by the delegation of tasks. A principal delegates a job to an agent because the agent possesses more or better resources than the principal (Coleman 1994). This delegation is set out in a (mostly just metaphorical) contract (Jensen 2001). However, this relationship can be problematic since the agent aims to maximise his own utility, has different goals and risk attitudes than the principal and is able to take advantage of information asymmetries (Eisenhardt 1989). This includes the main problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Eisenhardt 1989, Jensen 2001, Shapiro 1987). In the case of moral hazard, the principal cannot observe the agent's behaviour precisely (so-called hidden action). As the principal wants the agent to act in his interest, he will try to prevent him from behaving in a way that is harmful to him, for example, via monitoring. However, this causes additional costs (Shapiro 1987). In addition to the possibility of revealing the agent's behaviour, the principal can also guide the agent's behaviour through incentive-compatible contracts (Eisenhardt 1989, Jensen & Meckling 1976). Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the agent is more likely to act in the principal's interest if the contracts are outcome-based. However, as their ef-

fectiveness are negatively correlated with outcome uncertainty, it is detrimental when other actors or other externalities cause uncontrollable variations in outcomes.

Three professional football leagues exist in Germany. The two highest merged into a separate association – the German Football League (DFL) – in 2001. However, like all clubs in Germany they are organized under the monopolistic umbrella organization of the German Football Association (DFB), which submits itself to the regulations of UEFA and FIFA. The DFB comprises two judicial organs, i. e., the Federal Court and the Sports Court. The Federal Court hears appeals against the decisions of the Sports Court, which is acting as a court of first instance. They are responsible for the prosecution and punishment of violations of the statutes like violence, racist or discriminatory statements as well as grossly unsportsmanlike behaviour or the usage of pyrotechnics (DFB 2020a). However, they do not punish wrongdoing stadium visitors. Instead they hold the clubs responsible for all actions of any third parties, such as players, employees, and fans, who are associated with them. The hosting clubs bear the liability for everything that happens in the stadium area before, during and after the match regardless of fault. Although the jurisdiction pronounces ex-post penalties, their aim is not the punishment, but to prevent reoccurrence (DFB 2020a, p. 40).

The DFB has a monopoly as the only organizer and owner of the national professional football leagues. The clubs profit from this monopoly due to high marketing revenues as a consequence of the exclusivity, in turn creating a strong incentive for their participation (Schubert 2014). The DFB aims at maximizing the reputation and position of football in society. Therefore,

it opposes in its statutes against different types of fan misbehaviour like violence or discriminatory statements (DFB 2019, p. 3). Maximizing order and security in the stadiums is an important goal of the association. Since the clubs are responsible for safety in their stadiums, the DFB asks them for compliance with its statutes. If they do not follow, the courts of the association will punish them. This observation leads us to the first principal-agent relationship: The DFB as the principal delegates the proper realisation of trouble-free and safe football games to the agents (clubs).

While the association has the clear goal of maximizing security, the clubs may pursue their own objectives. Although they also have an incentive to ensure a high level of security in the stadiums, they may want to achieve this under low monetary and social costs. They may be interested in keeping their costs for security low or in not increasing security measures to the point where they get problems with their fans (Choluj et al. 2020). The association cannot observe the behaviour of the clubs perfectly or without additional costs. **As described above,** the clubs can take advantage of this information asymmetry so that the problem of moral hazard arises. While the DFB makes various demands in its regulations for stadium security and can recognize in the licensing or annual reports how much effort and expenses the agents spent on security, it can, for example, not exactly observe what exact specifications the clubs make to the security service. Furthermore, even though a regular exchange between clubs and active fans is desirable, in another form of moral hazard, the clubs have an incentive not to share important safety information collected in those meetings with other authorities in order to not jeopardize the trust of the fans.

Even if the clubs can create the conditions to prevent riots in the stadium or in turn sometimes facilitates misconduct by their fans, the real culprits are the fans and not the clubs. While the association cannot access the fans directly, another principal-agent problem arises where the football clubs act as a principal of their fans. Their goal is to provide security in the stadium as inexpensively and little time-consuming as possible. The clubs lay down rules in their stadium regulations that every spectator must accept when entering the stadium grounds. They monitor the fans via security service, personalised tickets or the work of the fan department. The fans, on the other hand, want to maximize their own benefit, which sometimes means breaking the security rules of the clubs (Dunning et al. 1986). As the clubs cannot closely observe the fans' behaviour, they are confronted with the problems of information asymmetries. One of the most popular example of hidden action is the smuggle of forbidden pyrotechnics into the stadium (Brechtbühl et al. 2017, Choluj et al. 2020). Additionally, fans may not inform the club when they are planning to storm the entrance controls of a stadium, or indeed register choreographies but conceal critical parts of them. And even if the clubs can ex-post detect misbehaviour they are still facing the penalties from the associations against themselves.

Since the two principal-agent problems do not occur independently of one another, they must also be considered together and holistically in a two-stage principal-agent problem **or three-tier model**. **Tirole (1986) formulated this model by adding an intermediate supervisor between principal and agent. On the one hand, this supervisor is supposed to help the principal gather information about the agent, but on the other**

hand, he decides for himself whether he actually passes on the information correctly. This in turn poses the problem of collusion (mostly, but not exclusively) between agent and supervisor. They can maximise their mutual benefit in side contracts and act against the interests of the principal using their information advantage. Therefore, again, the principal has to undertake costly efforts to prevent himself from disadvantages. Multiple agents or principals can increase those costs, as they increase information asymmetries (Shapiro 1987). In order to deal with the asymmetries ‘rewards work better than punishments’ (Tirole 1986, p. 199). Further, collusion can rise over time given as both agent and supervisor can use past side agreements as a bargaining chip against each other. However, Tirole (1986) also states that collusion can have positive effects as it strengthens cooperation.

Possible issues arising from agency theory and our first conjectures concerning the punishment of fan misbehaviour are shown in Figure 1. The penalties, set out in an outcome-based ‘contract’, are intended to encourage the club to act in the spirit of the principal, i.e., the association. However, outcome-based contracts become problematic when the agent is strongly dependent on external factors. In this case, the club as the agent depends on the behaviour of other actors, the fans. The club, for his part, signs a second ‘contract’ with the fans and acts as their principal. Given different goals of the three involved parties the following problem might occur: *Due to the information asymmetries between the principals*

and agents and their different goals, the goals of the principals might not be achieved without additional costs or incentives. As the penalties do not directly hit the fans as actual originator of the misconduct, the association and its courts demand the clubs to allocate the received penalties to the perpetrators concerned. However, since the courts do not impose the penalties directly on the fans, the problems described before also apply here and are reinforced by conflicts of interest. Not only do the fans have incentives to avoid being punished, but also the clubs may have incentives not to pass on the penalties. A second problem could emerge from this: *The two-stage principal-agent relationship may lead to collusion between two of the involved actors, i. e., either between the association and the clubs or, more likely, between the clubs and the fans.* As these agency problems do not seem to be sufficiently incorporated so far, the incentive effects of the penalties should be affected, which may result in the following problem: *If the assumed agency problems actually occur, they will have a negative effect on the intended impact of the penalties.* In the following, the first two conjectures are addressed in Section 5.2 and the latter in Section 5.3.

(Insert Figure 1 here)

4 Methodology and Data

In order to check whether our initial impression that the penalties for fan misbehaviour are not effective is true, we conducted a quantitative pre-study. We analysed the development of the past penalties imposed by the German football jurisdiction and, as a kind of benchmark, the penalties of the UEFA for their club competitions. Since the season 2013/14 every sentence of the German courts has been accessible to the public on the website of the DFB (DFB 2020b). Before, only parts of the judgements had been published there. The data available for the UEFA is significantly more restricted as it contains gaps for several reasons. The incomplete data prevents a time series analysis on a European level so that only some general statements can be made.

In a first step, every sentence was read and hand-collected into a large data base. Our German database consists of all punishments between the seasons 2013/14 and 2019/20³ in the top three Divisions (Bundesliga, 2nd Bundesliga and 3rd Division) and the national Cup Competition. Altogether, the database includes 921 penalties for 1,514 games with offences. The European database comprises incomplete punishments between October 2014 and March 2020 in the UEFA Champions League, the UEFA Europa League and the qualifying rounds of both. Since the UEFA only pronounced penalties for individual matches in the period under consideration, the number of penalties and matches is the same: 374. For each penalty, we collected all available information, namely the involved game and opponents, the total amount of the fine, additional discounts or conditions like the exclusion of

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8 fans. Moreover, the reasons for the penalties and thus the nature of misbe-
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10 haviour like lightening pyrotechnics were coded and, if specified, listed with
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12 exact numbers (for example, 10 flares). **The results of the pre-study are**
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14 **presented in Section 5.1.**

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16 As pointed out in Section 2, scientific research has not yet ad-
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18 dressed the effects and (missing) effectiveness of punishments for
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20 fan misbehaviour. Data about the reasons for the ineffectiveness
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22 (and possible improvements) have not been available so far. There-
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24 fore, we aim to expand scientific knowledge by conducting basic
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26 research following an exploratory approach in the main study. In
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28 accordance with the aim of exploratory studies, which are typically
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30 qualitative in nature, we try to obtain a comprehensive picture of
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32 ‘punishment of fan misbehaviour’. The combination of this quali-
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34 tative study with a quantitative pre-study enables a multi-faceted
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36 picture and understanding of the research object and the social
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38 system (Kelle 2006, Kuckartz 2014).
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40 The main study uses qualitative data stemming from interviews
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42 to gain deep insights into the agency problems that contribute to
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44 the ineffectiveness of penalties and to show possible improvements.
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46 **The results are presented in Sections 5.2 to 5.4.**

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48 In order to understand the rules of action and effect-relationships, commu-
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50 nication is essential (Mead & Morris 1970). As interviews make an important
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52 contribution to this, mostly narrative and semi-structured expert interviews
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54 were conducted with the important stakeholders of the clubs (Anagnostopou-
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56 los 2011, Cicut et al. 2017, Senaux 2008) and the clubs themselves. Based
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on the findings of Anagnostopoulos (2011), Cicut et al. (2017) and Senaux (2008), one author interviewed representatives of the police, the football association, the sports jurisdiction, the clubs and their main sponsors as well as the active fan scene. With their statements, they represent on the one hand the system of professional football and on the other hand their relations towards this system. The interviews mainly focused on the issues of stadium security, fan misconduct, its causes and how to deal with it, the efforts of stakeholders to prevent it, the opportunities for stakeholders to influence club policy and suggestions for improvement concerning fan misbehaviour.

In the period between June 2019 and May 2020 a total of 26 interviews were carried out, amounting for more than 29 hours of conversation or nearly a quarter of a million transcribed words. If possible, the interviews took place face-to-face in the working or living environment of the interviewees in order to delve as deeply as possible into the field of investigation. This seemed to be not necessary in the case of the sponsors, and due to the high quantity not possible in case of the clubs. Representatives of both groups provided information in telephone interviews that took between 30 and 60 minutes. The face-to-face interviews with representatives of the association, police, active fan scene and sports jurisdiction lasted between one and two hours.

In detail, as Table 1 shows, seven interviews were carried out with decision-making representatives of the association and the sports jurisdiction. Additionally, eleven club officials took part in the study. Two of them were managing directors, one a member of the supervisory board, three were directors of the fan and social department and five directors of the security department. All of them were in charge of larger departments and have been

active in sport business for a long time. Five interview partners represented Bundesliga clubs, which all played in the UEFA Champions League during the last decade. Four interviewees spoke for clubs in the 2nd Bundesliga and two for clubs in the 3rd Division. The sample consists of clubs from all parts of Germany and of clubs with a large fan base as well as younger clubs with a smaller one. It also includes clubs that experienced a lot of misconduct by their fans as well as those whose fans were responsible for little or almost no misbehaviour.

(Insert Table 1 here)

Furthermore, a group interview with a chief of the police and two ‘spot-
ters’ (scene experts) was conducted. Two of the four sponsors, whose rep-
resentatives took part in our study, are listed in the German Stock Index
(DAX), which at that time comprised the 30 largest German companies.
Finally, face-to-face group interviews with three different active fan scenes
were carried out, lasting two hours on average and comprising between two
and four representatives. The interview partners were belonging to different
ultra-groups, with two of them acting as ‘Capo’ (leader of an ultra group) in
their groups and some of them engaged in a work group together with their
club concerning the sentences for fan misbehaviour. Two groups support 2nd
Bundesliga clubs and one a Bundesliga club. One group supports a team in
the south, one a club in the west, and one a team in eastern Germany.

5 Results

5.1 *Development and Incentive Compatibility of the Penalties*

The analysis of the past sentences in Germany shows that on average 134 penalties are pronounced per season. The average fine for each conviction was € 14.880. Concerning the number of offences there were no striking differences between the three leagues. However, the clubs had to pay significantly higher fines the higher their division is. While 3rd Division teams had to pay on average € 5.972 and 2nd Bundesliga teams € 15.110, Bundesliga teams were fined € 27.298 per conviction. The fines of UEFA fit this picture as they charged in their competitions on average € 23.555 per conviction.⁴ Nevertheless, compared to the revenues and transfer expenditures of the clubs the fines are neglectably low. In addition to monetary punishment, the UEFA imposed the exclusion of fans much more often. Since 2017, the German sports judiciary has only applied this in very exceptional cases. By far the most sentenced misconduct of both jurisdictions was the lightening of pyrotechnics. Therefore, special attention will be paid to this type of misbehaviour in the following.

The avoidance of reoccurrence of fan misbehaviour is the main goal of the sentences by the sports jurisdiction. If the penalties enabled an achievement of this goal, one would observe less misbehaviour and consequently a decrease of punishments over time.⁵ However, no decrease can be observed in Germany (see Table 2). On the contrary, with the number of convictions,

the number of punished games and the number of exclusions (until 2017), all indicators of the sentences have been increasing over time. The last season under consideration is distorted by Covid-19 as no fans were in the stadiums and penalties imposed after the outbreak were reduced and therefore not included. Additionally, as Figure 2 reveals, there has not been any reduction of the most punished offences. In each season under review, more than 60 % of the sentences included the forbidden lightening of pyrotechnics. The findings suggest that the sentences are not able to achieve their target of avoiding the reoccurrence of fan misbehaviour. This could be due to several principal-agent problems that will be analysed in more detail in the rest of the paper.

(Insert Table 2 here)

(Insert Figure 2 here)

5.2 *Agency Problems at the Example of Pyrotechnics*

When the interviewees were asked about types of misconduct, the use of pyrotechnics was named by a clear majority. Additionally, it was by far the most often mentioned kind of misbehaviour. The results of Section 5.1 also highlight the strong role of pyrotechnics. While the lightening of pyrotechnics is forbidden by the disciplinary regulations of FIFA, UEFA and their member associations like the DFB, the active fan scene is strongly linked to pyrotechnics. Hardly any interviewee did not mention pyrotechnics and ultras together in one sentence at least once. All interviewed active fan scenes

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8 had a similar point of view like that 'it is clear that pyro will not disappear
9 from the stadiums' (F11) or 'will not become less' (F22), because 'that is a
10 shitty ban, we will not comply with it' (F21). In their opinion, 'it should be
11 self-evident, this is a method to heat up the atmosphere' (F11).
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16 As the association and the courts argued that 'legalisation is not justi-
17 fiable' (J12) and the clubs have to follow the rules, the *first principal-agent*
18 *problem between clubs and fans* comes into play. Since the active fans are not
19 willing to give up pyrotechnics, they exploit the information disadvantage of
20 the clubs and smuggle the objects into the stadium despite the prohibition.
21 'Everybody gets the stuff in' (F22) argued the active fan scene and even if
22 the clubs occasionally find something, the security officers had to admit that
23 what is found is 'only a small part' (C32). Irrespective of their own attitude
24 towards pyrotechnics, the club representatives agreed that 'one will not be
25 able to exclude it' (C32) or that 'you can never prevent pyrotechnics 100%'
26 (C14). They said that 'especially when it comes to pyrotechnics, one has
27 no chance' (C11). Even a sports judge confessed that pyrotechnics 'cannot
28 be prevented' (J12). This is also due to the fact that 'repression creates
29 innovation' (A11) and leads to resignation among many club representatives.
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45 'If people want to do it and plan it, they do it, we don't stand a
46 chance, no matter how much we control on the day of the game,
47 before the game, somehow the stuff comes in at the end.' (C15)
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52 'That's bullshit, so that stuff has always been smuggled in, once
53 I realise that, I don't need to concentrate on it because it just
54 frustrates me.' (C22)
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Simply using more security staff, as demanded by the DFB (2014), was not considered by the clubs to be expedient. Some of them became quite emotional, for example by accusing 'Mr X (of the association) is talking nonsense' (C14). As many club managers had the feeling that they cannot implement the association's guidelines and prevent pyrotechnics anyway, a *second principal-agent problem, namely between association and clubs* arises. In general, the clubs use their information advantage. Because they do not want fans to wait forever at the security check and perhaps arrive too late at the stadium, less control is exercised than would be possible. A club manager said: 'if we control this, according to the motto of Mr X with an ultimate last form, I tell you, we never start the game on Saturday noon' (C14). While some of the interviewed club officials stated that they pursue a 'zero tolerance policy' (C23) concerning pyrotechnics, others rely on dialogue and agreements with their fan scene. These clubs use their informational advantage as agents in order to make secret deals with their active fans without informing the principal (association).

Representatives of clubs that make such agreements argued that you 'cannot convince the scene of the opposite' (C15) and 'then it's okay, on the other hand they accept if we say that at a certain point it's over' (C15). Another one admitted: 'Of course I'm playing along and that's always a bit of give and take. (...) these are certainly not official deals and nobody will stand up and say yes, I have an agreement with my ultras that they will ignite four times but not the fifth time. (...) But I think that is the case in many clubs where there is at least a reasonable communication' (C24). Furthermore, another club representative explained that 'if we then sit down with the ultras,

luckily we have a trusting relationship, I say guys, like three or four times a season and if the penalties don't exceed this and that, I think we can all live with it' (C22).

All of the active fan scenes surveyed also used a variant of the often quoted phrase 'give and take' (F11) in this context. One group, for example, reported on 'regular exchange, where one can also talk openly about such things' (F21) and 'if there are really reasonable people on both sides, then one can usually find a reasonably good solution' (F21). The ultras also attached great importance to this, because 'a sense of proportion is applied in any case' (F21) and that they 'know you (the club) have to do your job, you can't do without security controls. We'll make sure it (the pyrotechnics) is not excessive' (F22). With regard to such agreements, a sports judge explained: 'We are not officially aware of this, but I can well imagine that this is the case' (J11).

Partly to address the criticism expressed that clubs cannot always prevent misconduct and therefore feel unjustly punished, the association demands the clubs to 'allocate the received penalties to the perpetrators' (J11, J12, J13) concerned. This passing is controversial from a legal and social point of view (Noli 2016). However, since the courts do not impose the penalties directly on the fans, a *two-stage principal-agent problem between all involved actors* applies here. Not only do the fans have incentives to avoid being punished, but also the clubs have incentives not to pass on the penalties. The fans have developed various strategies to ensure that misconduct cannot be attributed to any individual through a 'conspiratorial behaviour' (P). They manage to smuggle prohibited items into the stadium or ignite their pyrotechnics

in a disguised manner 'under the protection of a large banner' (P). The active fans agreed that one has to be 'really stupid' (F22) to get caught with pyrotechnics. The police also complained that in this context it is 'simply not possible to assign individual punishments' (P) without risking escalation.

This alone often makes it impossible for those responsible in the clubs to pass the penalty on to individual persons. They also complained that it is often 'not possible to identify the (individual) perpetrator' (C14) and that the club itself is 'not even responsible' (C12) for this. Some club managers, among them mainly those from 'plastic clubs' (Kurscheidt & Reichel 2019), which offer their fans only few opportunities for co-determination due to their club and committee structure, stated that they will pass on the punishment if the perpetrator is successfully identified. In the case of the clubs that do not pass on their punishments, both the fan scene and the clubs spoke of a 'give and take' (F11, C23, C24) and 'gentlemen's agreement' (F22). The clubs do not want to burden their relationship with the fan scene by passing on their fines and the fan scene in turn pleads for community service or assistance in the clubs instead of a fine. Even the sports judges noticed that 'many clubs do not want to pass on the penalties' (J13) and that the passing on varies between '0 % to 80 %' (J12) depending on the club. As possible reasons they stated the 'unseizability of some offenders' (J12) and the 'fear of the fan groups, for example not to be re-elected and therefore lose the job' (J12). A representative of a 2nd Bundesliga club, who previously spoke of a zero-tolerance policy towards misconduct, said with regard to the passing on:

‘However, we reserve the right to apply a penalty on a case-by-case basis. That brings us back to the subject of give and take. Of course, we know that this is not entirely consistent with our zero-tolerance policy. Perhaps things would be different if we tried to apply these penalties. But then we assume that this would have many negative consequences for our internal relationship with the ultras. That is why we have always handled it in such a way that we have accepted this punishment on condition of probation.’

(C23)

In summary, due to the different objectives of the parties involved and the unequal distribution of information, various problems arise. The fans do not want to do without pyrotechnics and are sure that they will always find ways to use them even if they are banned. Although safety is important for the clubs, they cannot and sometimes do not want to control the fans exactly. Their aim is not congruent with that of the federation. While the association does not tolerate pyrotechnics, many club representatives are satisfied if they can keep their use to a minimum. That is why secret agreements are sometimes made with the fan scene on this subject. Since many scenes also have a great deal of influence in the clubs, club officials partly refrain from passing on the penalties so as not to turn these groups against themselves.

5.3 *Impact of the Penalties*

The association holds the clubs liable for the misconduct of their fans. This results first of all in the principal-agent relationship between the association and the clubs. In order to remove the club’s incentive not to comply with the security rules set by the federation, the association imposes ex-post penalties to ensure compliance with the regulations in the future. Following the economic theory of optimal punishment, the association should pursue a high probability of detection, an appropriate penalty level and prompt punishment in order to achieve this compliance. The probability of detection of an incident is extremely high since cameras and spectators in the stadium can see forbidden banners, pyrotechnics or thrown beer cups. The time between misbehaviour and judgement has significantly decreased over the last years, as the interviewed judges confirmed. Nevertheless, the penalty level seems to be too low. One judge argued, that some clubs ‘laugh their heads off’ (J13) concerning the low level of punishments. As a Bundesliga team got fined on average € 27.298 and this on average two times a season, the amount is infinitesimal compared to transfer spending or revenues. Even the judges stated that ‘the fine does not cause the club any work and is treated more like an accounting item’ (J11).

However, representatives of the association and courts also said that the fines ‘increase the clubs’ sense of responsibility’ (A13), that ‘they encourage the club to make more efforts (in terms of infrastructure and personnel)’ (A11), that they should serve the clubs as an ‘argumentation aid towards the fans’ (J11) and that a possible ‘reduction of fines has influence’ (J12). For

example, the clubs can apply to use one third of the penalty themselves and thus invest in security (e. g., installing of new fences or camera systems). This discount is the only influence the clubs themselves saw. They appreciated to invest a part of the punishments meaningfully in own projects. Besides, they indicated that the safety standards are set as high as possible and that the certifications of the federation and not the penalties have a large influence. The fans also did not see any permanent changes in the safety precautions of their clubs after penalties. They argued that almost all clubs have to pay penalties and therefore a 'reasonably balanced balance sheet' (F21) between the clubs should prevail over the season.

All stakeholders interviewed unanimously stated that the penalties have nearly no influence on the misbehaving fans, at least as long as the penalized club does not pass these penalties towards the fans. The active fan scene also indicated that the penalties do not influence their behaviour. On the contrary, the interviews revealed that the punishments even incite some groups to more misconduct. In 2011, Frankfurt's active fans exposed a banner with the words 'Randalemeister' (riot champion), as their club had to pay the most fines of the season. Following on from this, an interviewed group reported that they also wanted to win this 'title' in a season with the clear goal 'We wanted to make riots (...) Yes, if you realize you're already relatively high up, then you want to get to the top' (F11).

The problem that the penalties do not hit the actual originator of the misconduct was also recognised by the associations and courts. Therefore, they demanded a 'transfer of the sentences to the fans' (A11, J11, J12, J13). The economically optimal penalty level would be much lower for an individual

than for a club. € 1,000 for lighting a torch at a Bundesliga match (DFB 2020a, p. 41) would certainly have a much greater impact on a stadium visitor than on a club with millions of revenues. Here, one should rather question whether the penalties would not be too high in order to create incentives (Block & Lind 1975). While the sentences can be passed on relatively quickly, the big problem is convicting the offenders, since the probability of detection of individual offences is very low as stated before.

To sum up, the penalties seem to have only a small impact on the behaviour of the clubs. At the same time, all interview partners saw hardly any influence on the fans. This could perhaps be established by passing on the penalties. However, a consistent passing on of penalties would have consequences on the relationship between fans and clubs that could be more negative than the occasional sentences for pyrotechnics, as explained in Section 5.2. The current policy may even encourage fans to engage in more misconduct as they try to become 'riot champion'.

5.4 *Suggestions for Improvements to Reduce Fan Misbehaviour*

Each interviewee made one or more suggestions for improvements to reduce fan misbehaviour. Some suggestions were formulated in a similar way by the majority of interviewees, while others were controversial. In the following, we are going to differentiate between proposals for improvements that mainly refer to a change in penalties and those that are not related to penalties.

As an example of improvements that are *related to penalties*, prompt pun-

ishment were considered important by various stakeholders. This observation is consistent with Eide et al. (1994) and Warner & Pleeter (2001). Moreover, the penalties should be graded in a more differentiated manner (*graduation*), as smaller clubs in particular felt disadvantaged. Opinions differed most with regard to the *severity of the penalties*. While some called for stronger sanctions in the form of point deductions or abandonment of matches, others saw this as too much interference with competition. The active fan scenes countered a demand for higher fines by saying that they are more likely to be incited to ignite even more. This is probably also due to the fact that penalties are hardly ever passed on. A stronger pursuit of this approach was almost exclusively mentioned by representatives of the association and courts.

Fines were also discussed. The active fans hoped that the sports courts will tolerate and not punish the use of pyrotechnics. However, the sports court argued that this is legally impossible. A club representative suggested to put the fines into a fund that smaller and financially weak clubs could use to raise their safety standards. Two others suggested that fines should be deducted from a club's fan budget, which provides financial support for fans on away trips and other activities.

The *sports justice system* itself was also covered by the proposals. The demand of the fan scene and some club representatives to abolish it and to involve state courts was countered by legal aspects, including higher penalties for clubs and an overburdening of state courts. Another suggestion was that the penalties should not be imposed by the association but by the clubs. This would ensure more acceptance of the penalties. On the one hand, this

could reduce the described two-stage principal-agent problem and on the other hand it could promote the internal deals also described.

Proposals to reduce misconduct that are *not related to penalties* clearly focused on *dialogue* across all stakeholders (see Table 3). Much more emphasis should be placed on listening to and understanding the other parties. Furthermore, it was mentioned that *relegation matches* should be abolished because this is where the most serious incidents occur. This justification can be supported by our empirical analysis of past penalties. Some argued for more *monitoring*, which includes better fan separation, improved camera systems, more powers for the security service or, contrary to this, house rules for the police. However, with the exception of fan separation, all other points were subject to rebuttal.

(Insert Table 3 here)

In order to maintain a good dialogue, the importance of *stable club management* was also emphasised by various stakeholders like the importance of approaching each other and make *compromises*. The desire for *honesty and consistency of the association* was mentioned even more often. Across all stakeholders and even from the sports judiciary and the association itself, the communication of the association was criticised. Again and again the same criticism was voiced that the association acts inconsistently. It first gives the fans (false) hopes and creates expectations on certain issues, which it then disappoints itself. Then it often breaks off the dialogue. Even a sports judge spoke of a ‘joke’ (J12) and the active fans pointed out that ‘a lot of

credit was lost' (F22) over the last years.

6 Discussion

As the analysis of past penalties has shown, the penalties do not achieve their objectives due to several agency problems. The first conjecture that emerged from agency-theoretical considerations was that information asymmetries between principals and agents could mean that the goals of the principals cannot be achieved without additional costs or incentives. This conjecture is consistent with the statements of the interview partners and reflected by them. From the interviews, it became clear that clubs do not control stadium admissions to the extent that the association would like. For example, the club controls the security staff by means of certification, but a precise control by the association would mean a high level of effort. Due to the high cost of ex-ante prevention of the smuggling of prohibited items, it is economically sensible for the principal to sanction deviations from the agreements ex post instead.

Penalties are mainly imposed for illegal lightening of pyrotechnics, which is largely attributed to the clubs' active fan scene. Given the information asymmetries, a main agency problem between clubs and fans is that the active fan scene has developed various tactics that often make it impossible to assign the misconduct to the right individual and thus to pass on the penalties. On the other hand, all in-

interviewed stakeholders were aware of their influence on the clubs and their importance for the atmosphere in the stadium. Due to their structure and organisation, the active fans can exert the most influence among all fans (Doidge 2017, Spaaij & Viñas 2005, Totten 2016). Therefore, club officials might have no interest in entering into a strong conflict with this group by passing on the penalties. Otherwise, not only could there be great upheaval in the clubs, but the re-election of the individual representatives could also be endangered. Future research should examine this relationship between clubs and active fans and its influence on other stakeholders in more detail and try to determine the extent to which these stakeholder relationships prevent or facilitate fan misconduct.

Due to these interdependencies between the club and the fans, the problem of collusion (described in the second conjecture) arises. As the interviews revealed, some clubs make secret agreements about a still tolerable number of misconduct. Those secret agreements are similar to the side-contracts described by Tirole (1986). Furthermore, clubs often do not pass on punishments to fans as requested by the association. But as long as the passing is rarely implemented, the punishments do not affect the misbehaving parts of the fans and thus seem to have no strong effect on their behaviour. A stricter pursuit of this approach could increase incentive compatibility. As an ultra stated: 'if the risk of discovery is low, then I do it (the misconduct). But if it would be higher, then, of course, I would not do it' (F22). Even if it makes sense from an agency-theoretical point of view, legal doubts about this approach must

also be taken into account (Noli 2016, Shvets 2016).

Apart from the fact that it is not always possible to pass on penalties, the DFB has little opportunity to increase incentives for clubs to behave accordingly. For example, higher penalties would perhaps hit the clubs harder, giving them an incentive to transfer the damage from itself to the polluter. However, it is doubtful whether the polluters could actually pay this high amount and whether this would be in accordance with state laws. In addition, the associations are also interested in a good relationship with the active fan scene since the atmosphere in the stadiums is important for good marketing of the individual professional leagues, too. One judge said with regard to higher penalties, that 'of course they (the association) would not agree' (J12) and a representative of the association believed that they are 'definitely not too low' (A11).

Considering the economic theory of optimal punishment, the agency problems have a negative effect on the intended impact of the penalties (see third conjecture in Section 3). As long as the transfer of sentences is not feasible or the association cannot otherwise directly punish the fans, the penalties do not constitute a useful intervention from an economic point of view. While the probability of conviction for the punished clubs is high, the level of penalties is far too low. For the misbehaving fans, the probability of detection is too low, the penalty rarely reaches them and even if it did, the time lag between the criminal behaviour and the punishment could be very large due to the passing.

Each interviewee was also asked about his opinion about possible improvements with respect to the penalties. Most of the suggestions were either put

forward by only a few individuals or by only some groups while other groups disagreed. Only the dialogue was named and supported by almost all participants. Even though most of them had already recognized an improvement of the inter-stakeholder dialogue and exchange in recent years, the further development and strengthening was considered as very important. This opinion is also strongly represented in the literature (Cleland 2010, Grunig 2006, Numerato 2015, Stott et al. 2020, Totten 2016).

Within the framework of this dialogue it seems to be particularly important to develop possible solutions for the most frequently named and recurring problem area of pyrotechnics. The interviews showed that the active fan scene is not willing to give up this instrument. In addition, it was shown that the other stakeholders partly resigned and that some clubs took this into account by internal agreements with the scene. The results are consistent with the few similar studies of other European clubs or countries (Brechtbühl et al. 2017, Choluj et al. 2020). As the interviewees mentioned, pyrotechnic is usually most dangerous when it is thrown or used in an uncontrolled and risky way to avoid identification. Since the internal arrangements probably allow a more controlled use, they could be considered at least as an interim solution.

The penalties could contribute to these agreements. Although the active fans did not attribute it directly to the penalties, the penalties could be responsible for only lightening a limited number of pyrotechnics per season. The fans' statement that 'a sense of proportion is applied in any case (...) with regard to the club and not to some DFB jurisdiction' (F22) implies that the punishment has a small indirect impact on the fans' behaviour.

As it seems to be that they do not want to encumber their club with too many penalties, it is important for future research to explore how possible compromises between individual stakeholders on the issue of pyrotechnics could be shaped.

This study is not free of limitations. First, it is unrealistic to assume that penalties can completely prevent misconduct. Neither can sentences by the state courts, and football is always seen as a reflection of society as the interviewees stated. However, the written aim of the penalties is to prevent future misconduct. Therefore, it is reasonable to evaluate them against the background of this goal.

Second, while UEFA penalties were also considered in the quantitative part of the analysis, the interviews were only conducted in Germany. Even though the statutes of the major European leagues are very similar, as they are subject to those of the UEFA, it is not certain to what extent international implications can be drawn. However, to the best of our knowledge, there has never been such a comprehensive analysis for other countries so that we carried out important basic research. Future research should investigate whether our results also hold for other countries.

Third, we did not interview 'normal' fans, which are the much larger group compared to the active fan scene. However, in contrast to 'normal' fans, active fans are seen in the literature as the more important stakeholder. Nevertheless, it would be important in future research to consider the 'normal' fans as well. After all, the behaviour of active fans and the measures taken by the associations and clubs may have a signalling effect for all fans.

Finally, the active fan scene as a whole is not homogeneous. Individual

scenes sometimes pursue different objectives. Therefore, the statements of the three groups interviewed may not reflect the general opinion. However, their arguments were often quite similar. Additionally, since ultras are very rarely participating in interviews, there are hardly any scientific publications that include interviews from different active fan scenes. Apart from this major contribution to the existing scientific research, for the first time this paper brings together the views of all key stakeholders on important issues affecting football like the fan behaviour. This is especially remarkable against the background of the fact that some of the individual groups do not even communicate with each other, for example, the active fan scene strictly rejects dialogue with the police. Finally, until now it has been unique to model the punishments for fan misconduct as an agency problem, which enables us to make problems with the punishment visible.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we analysed the effectiveness of the penalties for fan misbehaviour. The results suggest that this effectiveness is low, as the penalties do not take sufficient account on various agency problems between different stakeholders. This is suggested by the fact that the intermediary clubs instead of the actual perpetrators of the misconduct are punished. Since the clubs rarely pass on the penalties as intended by the DFB, partly out of self-interest and political calculation, not a single interviewee saw a direct influence of the penalties on the fans' (mis)behaviour. Furthermore, the agents use hidden action, e.g., in order to smuggle things like pyrotechnics

or to make unpublicised agreements. In the light of the economic theory of optimal punishment, the fines thus do not create the full desired effect. In addition, they might act counter-productive if fan scenes organised a competition for the title 'riot master'.

The dominant punished misbehaviour is the lightening of pyrotechnics. As the fan scene takes advantage of the information asymmetries in the principal-agent relationship, it claims that it will continue using pyrotechnics in the future. Those responsible for the clubs admit that they are largely powerless against this as entrance controls can only find a small number of pyrotechnics, perpetrators cannot be identified beyond doubt or the relationship with the fan groups in general cannot be put at risk. For this reason, internal compromises are sometimes made. Compromises at all were as well mentioned as suggestions for the reduction of misconduct. The suggestion most mentioned was a further increase in dialogue. This could perhaps contribute on a larger scale to soften extreme positions and to strive for compromises which all stakeholders can agree with to some extent. This would be in the interest of the safety of all stadium visitors.

Notes

¹In the following, active fans are understood as fans 'who actively engage with clubs and supporter organizations' (Cleland 2010, p. 538) in order to partly influence them. The ultra-movement is almost congruent with the active fan scene. Their basic function is 'to provide expressive and colourful support to the team' (Spaaij 2007, p. 414). This creates high value for the clubs. The clubs and the active fan scene seem to be interdependent 'as each side ultimately determines the existence of the other' (Choluj et al. 2020, p. 76)

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²Non of these studies mentioned the entirety of fans as definitive stakeholders but the active fans. Anagnostopoulos (2011) identified just the ‘organized football fans’, Cicut et al. (2017) called them ‘supporters groups’ and Senaux (2008) ‘committed fans’. Therefore, this paper also concentrates on this group of fans and uses the term ‘active fans’ in the following.

³The data for the season 2019/2020 is incomplete because the courts have dropped some charges due to Covid 19 in order not to affect the clubs with additional financial burdens and because the season ended without fans in the stadiums.

⁴The German and the European fines are only comparable to a limited extent because the UEFA pronounced penalties for individual matches whereas the German convictions quite often refer to fan misbehaviour in more than one game.

⁵Of course, one could argue that without the punishments there might be much more misconduct. Nevertheless, the clearly stated goal of the DFB is to prevent future misbehaviour by punishing.

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


Figure 1: Principal-Agent Relationships




Figure 2: Frequency of the most punished misconduct

Organisation		Representative		
Association		A01, A02, A03, A04		
Jurisdiction		J01, J02, J03		
Sponsors		S01, S02, S03, S04		
Police		P		
	Bundesliga	2nd Bundesliga	3rd Division	
Club	C11, C12, C13, C14, C15	C21, C22, C23, C24	C31, C32	
Fan scene	F11	F21, F22		

Table 1: Interview partner

		2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18 *	2018/19 **	2019/20	Average Season***
League									
No. of punished games	Bundesliga	52	57	68	75	102	84	25	73
	2nd Bundesliga	57	59	73	83	71	90	37	72
	3rd Division	78	78	82	87	78	109	69	85
	All Leagues	187	194	223	245	251	283	131	231
No. of convictions	Bundesliga	30	28	38	34	40	72	23	40
	2nd Bundesliga	30	35	34	42	32	76	32	42
	3rd Division	33	51	45	45	47	91	63	52
	All Leagues	93	114	117	121	119	239	118	134
No. of spectator exclusions (on probation)	Bundesliga	0 (3)	3 (0)	3 (4)	3 (1)	0	1 (1)	0	0
	2nd Bundesliga	1 (2)	2 (3)	1 (3)	5 (7)	0	0	0	0
	3rd Division	1 (2)	1 (5)	8 (4)	7 (4)	0	0	0	0
	All Leagues	2 (7)	6 (8)	12 (11)	15 (12)	0	1 (1)	0	0
Penalty per conviction	Bundesliga	3,000,00 €	3,000,00 €	1,500,00 €	3,000,00 €	3,000,00 €	250,00 €	1,000,00 €	
	2nd Bundesliga	100,000,00 €	200,000,00 €	90,000,00 €	100,000,00 €	115,000,00 €	135,000,00 €	190,000,00 €	
		24,450,00 €	29,660,71 €	20,750,00 €	26,338,24 €	33,675,00 €	23,823,26 €	40,165,22 €	27,298,40 €
	Mean								
2nd Bundesliga	Min	1,000,00 €	2,000,00 €	1,000,00 €	1,500,00 €	2,000,00 €	500,00 €	125,00 €	
	Max	80,000,00 €	47,500,00 €	70,000,00 €	50,000,00 €	34,000,00 €	150,000,00 €	140,000,00 €	
		17,450,00 €	13,942,86 €	14,852,94 €	17,166,67 €	11,703,13 €	12,918,68 €	20,635,16 €	15,110,44 €
	Mean								
3rd Division	Min	1,000,00 €	1,000,00 €	750,00 €	1,000,00 €	500,00 €	175,00 €	75,00 €	
	Max	30,000,00 €	25,000,00 €	20,000,00 €	20,000,00 €	35,000,00 €	63,650,00 €	38,425,00 €	
		6,242,42 €	4,959,80 €	5,820,00 €	5,642,22 €	7,253,19 €	6,354,42 €	5,519,60 €	5,972,44 €
	Mean								
All Leagues		15,731,18 €	13,784,65 €	13,294,02 €	15,457,85 €	17,331,09 €	13,650,20 €	16,511,62 €	14,880,34 €

* Since this season it is recommended not to impose any spectator exclusions anymore.
** Due to new guidelines, the courts have been required to punish each offence individually since this season. This has significantly increased the number of punishments. In addition, penalties can be reduced if clubs identify perpetrator, which results in lower minimum fines.
*** The absolute figures do not include the Covid-19 season due to distortions.

Table 2: Overview of the penalties

	Dialog		Honesty of Association		Compromises		Monitoring	
	Absolut	Relative	Absolut	Relative	Absolut	Relative	Absolut	Relative
Association	3	75%	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%
	communication is the most important thing (A11)		unfortunately all fan dialogues are always cancelled (A12)		the fan scene (...) has to accept that not 100% is reachable (A13)		house rights for the police (in stadiums) (A14)	
Jurisdiction	3	100%	1	33%	1	33%	1	33%
	the quality of communication is crucial (J11)		the fans were fooled from the start (J12)		clubs need to become aware of their responsibility (J13)		personalised tickets (J11)	
Clubs	9	82%	4	36%	3	27%	4	36%
	constant dialogue, that's what's so crucial for me (C11)		it's such a back and forth (C31)		banner issues or pyrotechnics, just call for compromises (C22)		empowerment of security service (C23)	
Fans	2	67%	2	100%	2	67%	0	0%
	contact must be made (F21)		the fact that dialogue was stopped was totally flimsy (F11)		pyro becomes a regular and fans (...) have to take less risk (F22)			
Sponsors	3	75%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
	if you take the fans seriously (S14)							
Police	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
	dialogue is very important (P)							
Overall	21	81%	9	35%	8	31%	6	23%

Table 3: Most mentioned suggestions for improvement